Physician density in a two-tiered health care system  by Gächter, Martin et al.
PM
a
b
a
A
R
R
A
J
I
I
L
C
K
C
P
P
1
h
p
a
i
e
c
m
o
m
a
h
T
p
p
t
0
hHealth Policy 106 (2012) 257– 268
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Health  Policy
j ourna l ho me  pag e: ww w.elsev ier .com/ locate /hea l thpol
hysician  density  in  a  two-tiered  health  care  system
artin  Gächtera,∗,  Peter  Schwazera, Engelbert  Theurla, Hannes  Winnerb
Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck, Universitätsstrasse 15, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria
Department of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Salzburg, Austria
 r  t  i c  l  e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 6 November 2011
eceived in revised form 12 March 2012
ccepted 24 April 2012
EL classiﬁcation:
11
18
23
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We  investigate  the  density  of  non-contract  (private)  physicians  in  a  two-tiered  health  care
system, i.e.,  one  with  co-existing  public  and  private  health  care  providers.  In particular,  we
analyze how  the densities  of private  and  public  suppliers  of  outpatient  health  care  (general
practitioners  and  specialists)  are  related  to  each  other.  Using  a  panel  of 121  Austrian  dis-
tricts between  2002  and  2008,  we apply  a Hausman–Taylor  estimator,  which  allows  to  treat
each of  these  densities  as  endogenous.  We ﬁnd  that  the  density  of  non-contract  specialists  is
positively  associated  with  the  density  of  non-contract  general  practitioners,  but  not  signif-
icantly  related  to the density  of contract  general  practitioners.  We  also  observe  a  negative23
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relationship  between  the densities  of  non-contract  and  contract  general  practitioners  and
the ones  of  non-contract  and contract  specialists,  indicating  competitive  forces  between
the  private  and  the  public  sector  of the  outpatient  health  care  provision  in  Austria.  Our
results  contribute  to  the  ongoing  debate  on  the  role  of  non-contract  physicians  for health
care  provision  in  Austria.
 . Introduction
In many countries, disparities in the distribution of
ealth care capacities are a major concern for health care
olicy at least for two reasons. First, health care services
re typically associated with categorical goods, imply-
ng the often held claim that every citizen should have
qual access to an agreed minimum standard of health
are. Second, a maldistribution of health care capacities
ay  cause inefﬁciencies. In particular, an over-provision
f health care capacities in socioeconomic attractive areas
ight lead to supplier induced demand [17]. Concerns
bout such disparities apply to nearly all facilities of
ealth care provision, and especially to outpatient care.
here is a vivid and ongoing discussion in health sciences,
articularly in health economics, whether market based
hysician location policies cause the mentioned maldis-
ribution, and to which extent the state should regulate
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or stipulate entry to regional physician markets (see, e.g.,
[5,12,13,15,16,29–31,33,36]).
There are two broad lines of research explaining spatial
differences in physician densities. The ﬁrst strand of litera-
ture primarily focuses on the individual location decision.
The ‘prior contact theory’, for instance, stresses that physi-
cians are more likely to practice near and in locations where
they received their medical education or hold an afﬁliation
to a hospital (see, e.g., [14,24]). Other authors, focusing on
interviews of physicians, emphasize that individual charac-
teristics of physicians, such as the family background, play
a decisive role in the decision where to locate a practice
(see, e.g., [22,25–28]).  Further, there is an eminent line of
research in industrial organization focusing on the individ-
ual market entry and exit decisions of physicians and its
impact on competition in the health care sector (see, e.g.,
[1,7–10,35]).
The second line of research addresses directly the spa-
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.tial distribution of physician densities and tries to identify
factors explaining differences in the physician workforce
over urban and rural areas. Obviously, physician densi-
ties reﬂect not only entry decisions but also migration and
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market exits of physicians. The resulting disparities are typ-
ically explained by demand-driven factors, like a region’s
demographic, socioeconomic and technological back-
ground, as well as the speciﬁc characteristics of a region’s
health care system (i.e., the availability of health care
facilities acting as substitutes or complements to the out-
patient physician workforce), including the corresponding
legal environment which is important for a patient’s access
to health care (e.g., differences in cost sharing schedules
between regions). This translates into a (reduced form)
framework where the physician density at a given location
is regressed on a set of a region’s demographic, geograph-
ical, socioeconomic and institutional variables (see, e.g.,
[6,23,30,31]).
This paper contributes to the research on regional dis-
parities in physician density and is, thereby, related to the
second strand of literature mentioned above. Rather than
treating the physician workforce as a homogeneous group,
as in previous papers on this ﬁeld of research, we focus on
location decisions of physicians acting in two-tiered health
care systems. For this purpose, we refer to the Austrian
health care system, where physicians with and without a
contract with the public social insurance system co-exist
(henceforth, we refer to the former ones as contract and to
the latter ones as non-contract physicians).  While market
entry for contract physicians is strongly regulated by pub-
lic agencies, non-contract physicians are free to choose a
location. They are also less restricted in pricing policies and
service provision. For these reasons, we restrict our atten-
tion to the location decisions of non-contract physicians.
Further, we distinguish between general practitioners
(GPs) and specialists (SPs), leaving with four different types
of physicians: non-contract and contract general prac-
titioners (PGPs and CGPs) as well as non-contract and
contract specialists (PSPs and CSPs). To study how the cor-
responding physician densities are related to each other,
we exploit information from 121 Austrian districts over the
time period 2002–2008. We  estimate the local density of
one type of non-contract physicians (PGPs or PSPs) as a func-
tion of the densities of contract physicians (CGPs and CSPs)
and the remaining density of non-contract physicians,
among other factors such as a region’s hospital facili-
ties, educational level or aggregate income. This, in turn,
allows to draw conclusions about the existence and inten-
sity of competition between these types of physicians in a
two-tiered health care system. Our results generally sug-
gest competitive forces between contract and non-contract
physicians, which, together with the observation that the
number of non-contract physicians increased sharply rel-
ative to the one of contract physicians in recent years,
might also contribute to the ongoing debate about the
role of non-contract physicians for health care provision in
Austria.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the institutional background of the Aus-
trian health care system, giving particular emphasis on
health care provision of non-contract and contract physi-
cians. From this, we elaborate three testable hypotheses
regarding the relationship between non-contract and con-
tract physicians. Section 3 provides a brief overview over
the data, works out the econometric framework to analyzey 106 (2012) 257– 268
interrelations between densities of different types of physi-
cians, and discusses our empirical ﬁndings. Finally, Section
4 concludes.
2. Institutional background and main hypotheses
From a demand and ﬁnancing perspective, the public
health insurance system represents the ﬁrst tier of outpa-
tient care in the Austrian health care system. Membership
in this system is obligatory not only for wage earners
in the public and the private sector, but also for self-
employed persons (including farmers). Individuals with
family ties to obligatory insured persons and without own
coverage obtain free health coverage. Overall, the pub-
lic health insurance covers around 98.5 percent of the
whole population, excluding only marginal groups from
public health insurance. It is mainly ﬁnanced by income
related contributions. Private health insurance and out-of-
pocket payments constitute the second tier of the Austrian
health care system. Roughly 35 percent of the population
has signed contracts with private sickness funds, which
predominantly offer additional coverage to the ﬁrst tier ser-
vices and/or improve the possibility to choose a provider
within the system.
Health care services are supplied by contracted physi-
cians and by their non-contracted counterparts. Both
groups are self-employed and are mainly working in sin-
gle practices (see [21, p. 118]). The spatial distribution
of contract physicians is based on a location plan agreed
between the public health insurance system and the Cham-
ber of Physicians. It speciﬁes the regional distribution of the
physician workforce derived from the basic health needs
of the relevant population. It also has to ensure a sufﬁcient
provision of medical services based on the existing state
of medical standards. A contract physician’s contract relies
on bilateral agreements negotiated between the relevant
(regional or federal) Chamber of Physicians and the Fed-
eral Association of Social Security Institutions on behalf of
the sickness funds. It determines important dimensions of
physician services, such as the practice style (e.g., ofﬁce
hours, treatment guidelines or restrictions of additional
occupations) or the physician payment scheme. The assign-
ment of a contract is based on criteria like waiting time or
professional experience. Once concluded, the contract is
not limited in time.
Contract physicians generate income from fee-for-
service and lump-sum payments. The latter can be claimed
for initial contacts and for the provision of basic services.
The share of lump-sum payments to total physician earn-
ings varies widely over different ﬁelds of specialization.
At an aggregate level, it amounts to about 68 percent
for CGPs and around 34 percent for CSPs [37]. The fee-
for-service component of remuneration includes earning
caps, inducing decreasing marginal revenues per patient
and treatment. Contract physicians are also allowed to
earn extra money by providing additional services beyond
the contract (e.g., school services). The scale of these
activities, however, is strictly regulated by the physician
contract (e.g., via upper limits of working time in such occu-
pations).
lth Policy 106 (2012) 257– 268 259
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Fig. 1. Competition and referral between non-contract and contract
physicians. Notes: Competition between physicians is represented by the
dark arrows, referrals from one type of physicians to other ones are indi-
cated by the gray shaded arrows. Dashed arrows indicate relationshipsM. Gächter et al. / Hea
In contrast to contract physicians, their private coun-
erparts are free to choose their practice location. Their
emuneration is mainly based on a fee-for-service system.
he corresponding fees are agreed between the physician
nd the patients, albeit there exists a recommendation for
he physician pricing policy by the Chamber of Physicians.
urther, they are allowed to earn extra money without
ny restrictions (e.g., by working in a private or public
ospital).
Patients with public health insurance coverage are basi-
ally free to consult a contract or a non-contract physician,1
ut the incurred costs are considerably different. While the
tilization of public outpatient health care is based on a
eneﬁt-in-kind scheme with only negligible cost-sharing
lements,2 treatment costs in the private sector (i) have to
e paid out-of-pocket, (ii) are born by the private health
nsurances, and/or (iii) by the public health insurance. The
atter only reimburses parts of a non-contract physician’s
nvoice. The maximum amount refunded is ﬁxed at 80 per-
ent of the amount a contract physician would receive, but
nly if the non-contract physician’s services are included in
he public beneﬁt catalogue. Further, since prices of such
ervices are usually well above the ones of contract physi-
ians, the cost sharing rate is much higher than 20 percent
n most cases.3 Therefore, we would expect that services
f non-contract physicians are only demanded if the addi-
ional costs are at least covered by the expected beneﬁts
e.g., shorter waiting times or higher treatment quality;
ee [32], for a more general approach on private health
are demand; Samhaber [34] provides empirical evidence
rom Austria on different motives to contact non-contract
hysicians). In this case, contract and non-contract physi-
ians are competing for more or less the same population of
atients, especially when providing very similar health ser-
ices. Consequently, services of non-contract and contract
hysicians can be viewed as substitutes, suggesting a neg-
tive relationship between the corresponding physician
ensities (in the following, we refer to this as ‘competition
1 Patients are also allowed to visit ambulatory care facilities of the pub-
ic  sickness funds. These facilities are especially important in dental care
exemptions are the provinces of Vienna and Styria, where ambulatory
are facilities offer a broader range of services). In the empirical analysis
elow, we  do not include dentists and, therefore, also leave out ambula-
ory facilities.
2 This is essentially the case for the sickness funds which are orga-
ized on territorial principles (Gebietskrankenkassen), basically covering
mployees in the private sector and roughly including 80 percent of the
ustrian population. The corresponding regulatory framework of sickness
unds for farmers, self employed and civil servants is somewhat different
especially with regard to the above mentioned cost-sharing elements).
3 Rough calculations for the period 2000–2004 show that the cost shar-
ng  percentage of the submitted physician bills amounts to about 40–70
ercent, with huge differences among specialties. Public insurance ofﬁ-
ials argue that only 50 percent of the public insured patients submit their
hysician bill for reimbursement. Thus, we  presume that the overall per-
entage of cost-sharing to utilize non-contract physician services is even
igher than the share mentioned above. In addition, our data show that the
ublic health insurance system spends around 10 percent of its expendi-
ure for outpatient care to reimburse the costs of non-contract physicians.
inally, the costs of non-contract physicians are not reimbursed if the
atient further contacts a contract physician of the same type within the
ame accounting period.between physicians that are not addressed in the empirical analysis below.
effect’). This competitive relationship between physicians
is summarized in the solid dark arrows of Fig. 1.
The competition effect implies that non-contract and
contract physicians of the same type provide substitu-
tive services, so that we would expect that PSPs and PGPs
tend to avoid markets with a higher number of CSPs
and CGPs, respectively. This is captured in #1 and #2 of
Fig. 1. Our ﬁrst hypothesis with regard to the relation-
ship between non-contract and contract physicians is as
follows:
Hypothesis 1. The density of PGPs (PSPs) should be nega-
tively related to the density of CGPs (CSPs).
On the other hand, patients typically use to visit a CGP
ﬁrst when demanding health care services.4 Therefore,
CGPs are able to inﬂuence patient ﬂows to other physi-
cians via their referral behavior, indicated as gray shaded
arrows in Fig. 1. Although referrals are not obligatory, they
enable contract physicians to alleviate treatment maxi-
mizing strategies intended to compensate for decreasing
returns per patient and treatment, resulting from the above
mentioned remuneration scheme. From this, it is generally
plausible to assume a positive relationship between the
density of CGPs and PSPs (henceforth ‘referral effect’, #3 in
Fig. 1). It should be noticed, however, that referrals from the
public to the private sector are rather unusual in Austria.
CGPs usually refer to CSPs (#7 in the ﬁgure), and thus, we
do not expect that PSPs beneﬁt strongly from a CGP located
4 Apart from this practical experience, it has to be mentioned that the
gatekeeping role of GPs is relatively weak in Austria, not only for non-
contract but also for contract physicians. Referral is only compulsory
for  some very speciﬁc outpatient services (especially X-rays and other
diagnostic procedures such as computer tomography or magnetic reso-
nance) and for hospital stays [21]. In addition, hospitals also run outdoor
departments (ambulances). Access to these ambulances does not require
referrals from GPs or specialists.
lth Polic
ues of around 16 (PGPs) and 35 (CGPs). The block on the
right-hand-side of Table 2 shows that the average density
of PSPs, deﬁned as the number of PSPs in a district over the
7 At the sub-national level, Austria is organized in nine federal states,260 M. Gächter et al. / Hea
in the same area.5 Therefore, we are able to derive a second
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Since PSPs and CGPs partly provide the
same services and referrals from the public to the private
sector are uncommon, the density of PSPs should be nega-
tively associated with the density of CGPs.
By way of contrast, the referral effect should be stronger
for PGPs if treatments are cumbersome or time consuming
[35]. Then, the density of PSPs would be higher in locations
with a higher PGP density, and vice versa (i.e., PGPs beneﬁt
from presence of PSPs as they create referral opportuni-
ties, see #5 in Fig. 1).6 Further, non-contract physicians are
more exposed to competition as they are not ‘protected’
by a physician location plan. Baumgardner [4] has shown
that physicians tend to cooperate or build up networks
under such conditions, which might be especially the case
between non-contract GPs and SPs. Although the substitu-
tive effect might also play a role between PGPs and PSPs (#4
in the ﬁgure), we would presume that it is outweighed by
a relatively strong impact of referral and network effects.
This leads to our ﬁnal hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Due to referrals, the density of PSPs should
be positively related to the density of PGPs. Further, since
PGPs beneﬁt from cooperation with PSPs if treatments are
cumbersome or time consuming, the impact of PSP density
on the density of PGPs should be positive.
Notice that also CSPs beneﬁt from referrals of CGPs (#7
in Fig. 1) and, to a lesser extent, of PGPs (arrow #6). How-
ever, as the location of contract physicians follows a ﬁxed
location plan by the Austrian public health insurance, it is
reasonable to assume that the densities of CGPs and CSPs
are not seriously inﬂuenced by private resources of outpa-
tient health care. After all, our description of the Austrian
health care system shows that the density of each particu-
lar type of physicians is affected by the density of the other
types of physicians. Below, we propose a speciﬁc empirical
framework to address these interrelations.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Data and descriptivesTo test the above mentioned interrelations among non-
contract and contract physicians empirically, we  employ
5 Interestingly, the literature on the physicians’ referral behavior is rel-
atively scarce. One exception is Atella and Deb [3],  who  analyze doctor
visits in Italy at the individual level. Among other things, they observe that
contract and non-contract specialist visits are negatively affected by pri-
mary care physician visits, indicating a competitive relationship between
primary care physicians and specialists. However, the corresponding coef-
ﬁcient on non-contract specialists is much higher than the one on contract
specialists, which, in turn, seems to conﬁrm our observation from Austria
that CGPs typically prefer CSPs over PSPs when referring to specialists.
6 Similarly, Atella and Deb [3] ﬁnd that visits to primary care physicians,
contract specialists and non-contract specialists are all positively related
to  unobserved heterogeneity. While we are not able to draw such a con-
clusion due to a lack of individual data, this result also suggests a positive
relationship among non-contract physicians, as they will tend to locate in
attractive markets where the demand for health care is high, i.e., where
people are already consuming a high amount of health care services.y 106 (2012) 257– 268
a data set from 121 Austrian districts between 2002 and
2008.7 Data from physicians and their specialties are avail-
able from Göschl CD MED, Handbuch für die Sanitätsberufe
Österreichs (years 2002–2008). As shown in Table 1, our
sample includes 14,569 (non-contract and contract) physi-
cians, on average. Over the whole sample period, about
56 percent of all self-employed physicians have signed a
contract with the public health insurance system, approx-
imately 48 percent of them are CSPs. The share of PSPs
is somewhat higher (around 70 percent) in the group of
non-contract physicians. Further, we  can see a substantial
increase (about 27 percent) in non-contract physicians over
the course of the years, which is the result of increased
medical graduates and stable capacity plans for contract
physicians. Finally, we also observe enough variation for
the number of non-contract physicians over time (the aver-
age annual change is around ﬁve percent for non-contract
physicians, but much lower for contract physicians), ren-
dering panel data (ﬁxed effects) estimation possible.
Based on the physicians’ locations, we  are able to cal-
culate the number of physicians per district and specialty.
In addition, we  use information on regional supply and
demand for health services, in our case a district’s aggre-
gate income, its average educational level (measured by an
index between zero and ﬁve)8, living area capturing trans-
port and time cost to consult a physician, and the facilities
of private and public inpatient care as measured by a dis-
trict’s total number of beds in private and public hospitals
(the corresponding data sources are listed in the Appendix).
Table 2 provides a descriptive overview of the dataset,
including means, standard deviations as well as minimum
and maximum values of our variables from the empirical
analysis below. Overall, our sample includes 847 observa-
tions, i.e., 121 districts over seven years. On average, we
observe 37 (around 32) PSPs (CSPs) in a district, with a mini-
mum of zero (one) and a maximum of 275 (227) physicians.
The corresponding ﬁgures for GPs are lower, with mean val-121 regional districts (including 23 districts of Vienna) and 2357 local
jurisdictions (communities and cities).
8 Speciﬁcally, we consider ﬁve main groups of educational levels. From
these, we  calculate an average level of education multiplying the numbers
of  persons in each group with the corresponding level of education, and
dividing the sum of the subgroups by the population above 15 years, i.e.,
E  =
5∑
L=1
POPL · L
POP15
.
L  corresponds to the level of education, POPL indicates the population
in each subgroup, and POP15 is the overall population above 15 years.
The  educational levels considered are (1) compulsory school, (2) appren-
ticeship or secondary education, (3) higher school certiﬁcate (general
qualiﬁcation for university entrance), (4) an additional education after
this school-leaving certiﬁcate (e.g., a polytechnic education or a college)
excluding university education, and (5) a university degree or equivalent.
Thus, we  obtain an index measuring the average educational level ranging
from 1 to 5 within regions, where increasing values indicate a higher level
of  education.
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Table  1
Non-contract and contract physicians in Austria.
Year Number of physicians
PSP PGP CSP CGP Sum
2002 3675 1560 3940 4289 13,464
2003  4013 1730 3924 4258 13,925
2004  4200 1792 3925 4261 14,178
2005  4612 2015 3932 4246 14,805
2006  4875 2046 3925 4217 15,063
2007 5025 2088 3918 4194 15,225
2008 5139 2115 3896 4165 15,315
Average 4506 1907 3923 4233 14,569
Change 2002–2008 (in percent) 28.49 26.24 −1.12 −2.98 12.09
Average annual change (in percent) 5.79 5.30 −0.19 −0.49 2.18
PSP, non-contract specialist; PGP, non-contract general practitioner; CSP, contract specialist; CGP, contract general practitioner.
Table  2
Descriptive statistics (847 observations).
Variable Absolute number Densitiesc
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Number of PSP 37.24 47.46 0.00 274.00 0.68 1.16 0.00 10.14
Number of PGP 15.75 15.05 0.00 93.00 0.27 0.30 0.00 2.87
Number of CSP 32.42 33.13 0.00 227.00 0.54 0.55 0.00 4.39
Number of CGP 34.98 20.58 1.00 161.00 0.53 0.07 0.33 0.76
Private  hospital bedsa 1.23 2.11 0.00 15.72 1.77 2.63 0.00 13.38
Public  hospital bedsa 4.00 5.77 0.00 36.05 6.11 7.77 0.00 53.87
Average incomeb 17.41 2.23 14.70 28.51 – – – –
Education 1.70 0.25 1.43 2.65 – – – –
Living  area (100 km2) 2.69 2.37 0.01 11.09 – – – –
a Number of hospital beds in a district, in 100.
b Income in 1000 Euro per person.
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tc Calculated as the total number of physicians/hospital beds in a distric
SP,  non-contract specialist; PGP, non-contract general practitioner; CSP, 
opulation size in 1000 inhabitants, is 0.68. The maximum
s around 10.1. For contract specialists, we observe a mean
maximum) value of 0.54 (4.39), and for CGPs we have a
imilar mean value of 0.53 (0.76). Only for PGPs we have a
elatively small representation in our sample (see Table 1),
ranslating in a much lower density of 0.27 (the maximum
ntry is 2.87).
Average annual income (net of taxes), measured by a
istrict’s total income to population size, amounts to about
7,400 Euro (the minimum is about 14,700 Euro and the
aximum amounts to 28,500 Euro). The largest district in
ur sample is around 1100 km2, with an average value of
70 km2. Further, we observe an average of around 123
400) hospital beds in the private (public) inpatient sec-
or. The corresponding maxima lie around 1572 and 3605
eds.9
Table 3 summarizes the distribution of physicians over
eneral practitioners and 14 specialties; the upper table
lock refers to the number of non-contract, and the lower
ne to the number of contract physicians within a dis-
rict. For example, we can see that there are, on average,
bout 16 GPs within a district; the corresponding maximum
9 A correlation matrix reveals that there is a close relationship between
ll  suppliers of the health care system, which is not surprising given the
bove-mentioned interrelations among contract and non-contract physi-
ians and hospital facilities. The corresponding ﬁgures are available from
he  authors upon request.000 inhabitants.
 specialist; CGP, contract general practitioner.
is 93. Within the group of non-contract physicians, the
main specializations are represented by internists (around
22.5 percent of all specialists), surgeons (21.7 percent),
neurologists (14.3 percent) and gynecologists (12.7 per-
cent). These are also the largest specializations among
contract physicians. There, our sample includes about 17.4
percent internists, 8.7 percent surgeons, 12.5 percent neu-
rologists and 14.3 percent gynecologists. Looking at the
maximum entries, we  observe some specializations with
rather low representations in both groups of physicians,
which is especially the case for lung doctors, urologists,
laboratory diagnostics and radiologists. In the empirical
analysis below, we account for the composition of special-
izations by (i) analyzing the whole group of SPs and (ii)
by focusing on specializations with relatively strong rep-
resentations in our sample of non-contract physicians, i.e.,
internists, surgeons, neurologists and gynecologists.
The last column of Table 3 reports the share of physi-
cians working in a public or private hospital in addition to
the activities in their practices. In this regard, we  can see
that there are large differences between GPs and SPs on the
one hand, and between non-contract and contract special-
ists on the other one. On average, more than 50 percent of
all non-contract specialists take up such outside activities, a
share that varies between 18 (pediatricians) and 68 percent
(surgeons). Obviously, hospital facilities might be viewed
as an opportunity to provide additional services and, there-
fore, a way  to increase income. From this, we would expect
262 M. Gächter et al. / Health Policy 106 (2012) 257– 268
Table 3
Non-contract and contract physicians per specialty.
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Hosp.a
Non-contract physicians
General practitioners 15.76 15.04 0 93 11.63
Specialists 37.24 47.46 0 274 51.37
Ophthalmologists 1.42 2.68 0 17 56.73
Dermatologists 1.47 2.51 0 16 43.50
Gynecologists 4.71 5.04 0 29 57.02
Otolaryngologist 1.13 1.88 0 14 63.19
Pediatricians 1.75 2.44 0 13 45.50
Lung  doctors 0.46 1.03 0 7 60.00
Neurologists 5.33 8.07 0 41 45.41
Orthopedists 2.24 3.01 0 20 52.98
Urologists 0.96 1.56 0 8 53.72
Laboratory diagnostics 0.40 0.88 0 6 61.70
Radiologists 0.93 1.52 0 11 49.55
Surgeons 8.07 12.27 0 81 67.64
Internists 8.38 10.82 0 70 58.00
Other  specialists 2.50 3.70 0 31 54.84
Contract physicians
General practitioners 34.98 20.58 1 161 7.89
Specialists 32.42 33.13 0 227 19.66
Ophthalmologists 3.08 3.03 0 23 24.60
Dermatologists 2.32 2.47 0 17 26.41
Gynecologists 4.64 5.00 0 38 20.00
Otolaryngologist 2.03 2.14 0 16 40.73
Pediatricians 2.58 2.60 0 20 18.71
Lung  doctors 1.25 1.46 0 10 18.95
Neurologists 4.04 4.21 0 32 37.30
Orthopedists 2.31 2.53 0 13 33.81
Urologists 3.53 3.63 0 21 36.47
Laboratory diagnostics 0.39 0.75 0 5 72.92
Radiologists 1.81 1.75 0 10 44.69
Surgeons 2.82 3.83 0 22 48.26
Internists 5.64 6.27 
Other  specialists 0.89 1.56 
a Share of physicians working in public and private hospitals.
Table 4
Number of physicians per district (year 2008).
Number of physicians PSP PGP CSP CGP
Less than 5 7 19 13 2
More than 5 and less than 25 56 79 54 39
More than 25 and less than 50 30 18 32 61
More than 50 28 5 22 19
Sum 121 121 121 121
PSP, non-contract specialist; PGP, non-contract general practitioner; CSP,
contract specialist; CGP, contract general practitioner.
that it is attractive to locate the practice near a hospital.
In the empirical analysis below, we explicitly account for
this reasoning using the number of hospital beds within a
district as a control variable to explain physician density.
Table 4 describes how (non-contract and contract) SPs
and GPs are distributed over the Austrian districts. For
example, we can see that there are seven districts in Austria
with less than ﬁve PSPs located within the district. The
lion’s share of the Austrian districts sustain more than
ﬁve and less than 25 non-contract physicians, especially
in the group of PSPs. With regard to contract physicians,
we observe the main group of representation in the classes
of more than 5 and less than 25 and of more than 25 and
less than 50 physicians. Generally, we have relatively few
districts with a low representation in our sample, so that it0 46 29.84
0 10 45.37
seems enough variation over districts rendering regression
analysis possible.
Finally, we  provide four ﬁgures in Appendix depicting
the spatial distribution of PSPs (Fig. 2), PGPs (Fig. 3), CSPs
(Fig. 4) and CGPs (Fig. 5), where the borders represent the
districts as our observational units (all entries in the ﬁgures
relate to 2005). Each entry in these ﬁgures indicates a physi-
cian’s location. Comparing the ﬁgures for (non-contract and
contract) SPs with the ones of GPs we can see that the former
are more located in agglomerations (i.e., the larger cities),
while the latter are more uniformly distributed over both
rural and urban areas. This pattern is less pronounced for
non-contract physicians.
3.2. Speciﬁcation and estimation
We are interested to explain the densities of (i) PSPs
and (ii) PGPs as a function of (contract and the remaining
non-contract) physicians and other demand- and supply-
related covariates of a district. Our sample includes 121
Austrian districts over seven years, so that we can rely on
a balanced panel. We  estimate two  separate regressions,
which read asPSPit = ˛1PGPit + ˛2CSPit + ˛3CGPit + Xiı + i + it, (1)
PGPit = ˇ1PSPit + ˇ2CSPit + ˇ3CGPit + Xi + i + εit, (2)
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Fig. 2. Spatial distribution of non-contract specialists.
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wFig. 3. Spatial distribution of
here i indicates the ith district, i = 1, . . .,  n. t is a time
ndex, t = 1, . . .,  T. PSP, CSP, PGP and CGP represent time-
ariant densities of non-contract and contract specialists
s well as non-contract and contract general practition-
rs. As mentioned above, physician density is measured
s the number of a group of physicians within a district
er 1000 inhabitants. Xi contains a matrix of independent
ariables including a district’s availability of hospital beds
n the public and private sector, average income, an index
f its educational level (see footnote 8), and living area.
iving area and the number of beds in private and public
ospitals are time invariant as well as all of the remain-
ng variables in X as they refer to the year 2001 (the year
here the actual population census has been carried out).ntract general practitioners.
i and i represent unobserved i-speciﬁc effects, it and εit
are idiosyncratic error terms.
From the discussion of Fig. 1 it is obvious that the
right-hand-side densities of non-contract physicians are
probably endogenous. Further, we  should also account for
endogeneity of (time-invariant) density of hospital beds in
the private sector. For instance, it might be true that the
PSP density in Eq. (1) is inﬂuenced by a district’s PGP den-
sity, but causation might also run in the opposite direction
if the presence of PSPs raises a district’s attractiveness for
PGPs due to increased referral opportunities. Similarly, it
is reasonable that private hospitals are located in areas
where the availability of non-contract physicians is high.
Such endogeneity issues also apply to Eq. (2).  We  assume
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Fig. 4. Spatial distribution of contract specialists.
 of contFig. 5. Spatial distribution
that these interrelations are i-speciﬁc, so that the density
of PGPs is correlated with i in Eq. (1) and orthogonal to it,
and the one of PSPs is correlated with i and orthogonal to
εit in Eq. (2).  Further, we assume that the right-hand-side
densities of both contract physicians and public hospital
beds are exogenous, which might be justiﬁed by the fact
that they are determined by the physician capacity and
hospital plans.
Applying a ﬁxed effects (FE) estimator under these con-
ditions would remove the time invariant Xi-variables, but
still provides consistent estimates of ˛1 and ˇ1 as well
as of ˛2, ˛3, ˇ2 and ˇ3 (see, e.g., [18, p. 337]). To esti-
mate the parameters ı and  , we apply a random effectsract general practitioners.
model as developed by Hausman and Taylor [19]. They
propose to assess the effects of time-invariant variables
in panels by generalized least squares (GLS) applying an
instrumental variable estimator to treat possibly endoge-
nous regressors. In our case, this approach is useful to
address the potential endogeneity of the right-hand-side
densities of non-contract physicians and private hospital
beds. Basically, the HT-estimator starts with the consistent
FE-estimates, takes the within residuals of this regression,
say eˆit , and, in a second step, regresses eˆit on Xi using
the time-variant exogenous variables as instruments (in
our case, the densities of contract physicians). From this,
we  obtain estimates of ıˆ  and ˆ , which, along with the
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Table 5
Estimation results.
PSP PGP
Density of PSP – 0.371***
(0.038)
Density of PGP 0.679*** –
(0.118)
Density of CSP −0.036 −0.060
(0.167) (0.091)
Density of CGP −0.376 −0.396***
(0.254) (0.127)
Density of private hospital bedsa −0.017 0.003
(0.077) (0.025)
Density of public hospital bedsa 0.070*** −0.022**
(0.026) (0.010)
Average incomea 0.340 −0.181
(0.327) (0.191)
Educationa 1.656** 0.342
(0.591) (0.255)
Living areaa 0.010 −0.011
(0.028) (0.012)
Observations 847 847
R2 0.880 0.787
Overidentiﬁcation: 2(13) 13.953 10.727
Endogenous regressor PGP PSP
PSP,  non-contract specialist; PGP, non-contract general practitioner; CSP,
contract specialist; CGP, contract general practitioner. Bootstrapped stan-
dard errors in parentheses (50 replications).
a Variables are time-invariant.M. Gächter et al. / Hea
stimates of the ˛s and ˇs from the within regression, can
e used to estimate the variance components ˆ2

( ˆ2) and
ˆ 2 ( ˆ
2
ε ) in Eq. (1) [Eq. (2)]. The estimated variance compo-
ents can be used to apply a GLS transformation on each
ariable in the model.10 Denoting the GLS transform of each
ariable with ‘*’, we ﬁnally obtain the HT-estimator from
he regressions
SP∗it = ˛1PGP∗it + ˛2CSP∗it + ˛3CGP∗it + X∗i ı + ∗i + ∗it , (3)
sing the within average yit , yit = yit − yit and the level
f the time-invariant but exogenous Xi-variables as
nstruments, where y ∈ {PGP, CSP, CGP}. Similarly, the HT-
stimator of Eq. (2) is exploited from
GP∗it = ˇ1PSP∗it + ˇ2CSP∗it + ˇ3CGP∗it + X∗i  + ∗i + ε∗it , (4)
sing zit , zit = zit − zit and the level of the time-invariant
ut exogenous Xi-variables as instruments, where z ∈ {PSP,
SP, CGP}. According to Amemiya and MaCurdy [2],  we
urther assume that i (i) are uncorrelated with the
ight-hand-side variables in Eq. (1) [Eq. (2)], imposing a
tricter requirement on the instruments than the original
T-estimator.
To test the HT-model against its FE counterpart we apply
 Sargan test on over-identiﬁcation [20, p. 227]. The cor-
esponding test statistic is distributed as 2 with T times
he number of exogenous time-varying variables minus the
umber of endogenous time-invariant variables as degrees
f freedom. If the test statistic is insigniﬁcant, the model is
onsistent and more efﬁcient than its ﬁxed effects counter-
art. If not, one should prefer the FE-estimates. Finally, we
ake the logarithm of all variables in our empirical mod-
ls to account for the fact that especially the dependent
ariables (densities of PSPs and PGPs) are not normally dis-
ributed but log-normally. We  further tested the linear
gainst the logarithmic model applying a J-test as pro-
osed by Davidson and MacKinnon [11], indicating that
he logarithmic speciﬁcation outperforms the one without
ogarithms.11
.3. Estimation results
Table 5 summarizes our estimation results. The Sar-
an test in the last line of the table is insigniﬁcant for
oth speciﬁcations, indicating that our instruments are
alid and, therefore, the HT-estimates should be preferred
ver the ones of the FE-model (not reported in the table).
ith regard to the time-invariant covariates, we  observe
nsigniﬁcant effects of private hospital beds, which might
e explained by the fact that this variable is not varying
ver time and not much over districts. The density of public
ospital beds is signiﬁcantly positive for PSPs and signiﬁ-
antly negative for PGPs, suggesting that PSPs (PGPs) tend
o seek (avoid) markets with public inpatient facilities. One
10 Denoting each variable in our model with w, the GLS transform is
iven by w∗
it
= wit − wit , where  = 1 − ( ˆ2 / ˆ2 + Tiˆ2)
1/2 in Eq. (1) [18,
.  338]. Similar applies to Eq. (2).
11 Below, we  do not report the results of FE-estimation and also the ones
ithout logarithms for the sake of brevity. They are available from the
uthors upon request.* Signiﬁcance at 10 percent level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5 percent level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1 percent level.
explanation might be that services of specialists are typi-
cally close substitutes to the one of inpatient facilities (and
especially their outdoor ambulances), which is not neces-
sarily the case for GPs. Education enters positively, but is
insigniﬁcant in the PGP equation. Income and living area
exhibit insigniﬁcant effects in both the PSP and PGP equa-
tions. Generally, one should interpret the corresponding
(negative and positive) parameter estimates cautiously as
there is a close correlation between both variables.
Regarding our relationship of interest, we  are not able
to conﬁrm the competition effect between CSPs and PSPs
(Hypothesis 1), as the density of CSPs does not appear sig-
niﬁcant in the PSP equation. However, this might be due to
the choice of the dependent variable, as the effects between
different specialties might cancel out each other, lead-
ing to a non-signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for CPSs. For instance,
it is reasonable that otolaryngologists or gynecologists
do not compete with dermatologists in a region. Below,
we account for this measurement issue distinguishing
between different specialties in our regressions. In con-
trast, Hypothesis 1 is conﬁrmed for PGPs, where we observe
a signiﬁcantly negative impact of CGP density, indicating a
dominance of the competition effect over the referral effect.
With respect to Hypothesis 2, we  ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant
negative impact of CGP density on the density of PSPs,
indicating that the competition effect more or less com-
pensates the referral effect for this type of physicians. Thus,
CGPs appear to be substitutes rather than complements to
non-contract specialists. One obvious explanation might
be that CGPs act as proﬁt maximizers and prefer longer
treatment processes instead of referring to PSPs. As men-
tioned above, this is due to the institutional design of the
266 M. Gächter et al. / Health Policy 106 (2012) 257– 268
Table 6
Estimation results for speciﬁc specializations.
Variable Physician density
PSPS PSPN PSPG PSPI
Density of PGP 0.164*** 0.150*** 0.134*** 0.164***
(0.050) (0.056) (0.044) (0.039)
Density of CSPa −0.473 −0.300* −0.555** −0.469**
(0.468) (0.183) (0.199) (0.166)
Density of CGP −0.322* 0.054 −0.056 −0.200**
(0.168) (0.085) (0.137) (0.092)
Density of private hospital beds 0.010 0.096* 0.067* −0.020
(0.043) (0.050) (0.038) (0.050)
Density of public hospital beds 0.021* −0.003 0.014 0.015
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
Average income 0.132 0.354 0.314 −0.143
(0.198) (0.244) (0.202) (0.265)
Education 0.671* 0.280 0.104 1.290***
(0.362) (0.302) (0.286) (0.290)
Living  area −0.002 −0.030** −0.017 0.002
(0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009)
Observations 847 847 847 847
R2 0.706 0.755 0.572 0.716
Overidentiﬁcation: 2(13) 14.556 9.465 9.597 17.500
a Contract physician with identical specialty as the corresponding dependent variable.
PSPS , non-contract surgeons; PSPN , non-contract neurologist; PSPG , non-contract gynecologists; PSPI , non-contract internists. Intercept not reported.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (50 replications).* Signiﬁcance at 10 percent level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5 percent level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1 percent level.
Austrian health care system, where GPs are able to refer to a
specialist when necessary, although it is not compulsory in
most cases. Further, the negative coefﬁcient might reﬂect
that CGPs prefer CSPs rather than PSPs when referring to a
specialist.
By way of contrast, we ﬁnd support for referrals from
PGPs to PSPs, entering positively in the PSP equation. This
lend support to Hypothesis 3 as it seems that non-contract
physicians (GPs and SPs) closely collaborate with each other
and to some extent build up networks within their districts.
Similarly, the coefﬁcient of PSP density in the equation
for PGPs is also positive and signiﬁcant, implying a certain
degree of network and cooperation effects, which might
be the result of referrals among non-contract physicians
(Hypothesis 3). Similar to the PSP equation, we  ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant relationship between the densities of CSPs and
PGPs.
In sum, our estimation results from Table 5 might be
interpreted that PSPs and PGPs tend to establish networks
or cooperations within their districts. The density of CGPs
enters signiﬁcantly negative in the PGP-equation, indicat-
ing competition effects especially with PGPs and a relatively
low importance of referrals to PSPs. For CSPs, we are not able
to identify any signiﬁcant effects on the densities of PGPs
and PSPs. It should be noticed that the latter include a wide
variety of very different specialities (see Table 3), which
might explain the insigniﬁcant impact of CSPs, as discussed
above. We  account for this by re-estimating Eq. (2) sepa-
rately for the four largest groups of specialities reported
in Table 3 (i.e., internal specialists, surgeons, neurologists
and gynecologists), including the corresponding densities
of CSPs as the right-hand-side variable, among the other
ones in Eq. (2).  The estimation results from this exercise
are reported in Table 6. Again, we rely on the HT-estimates,which can be justiﬁed by the insigniﬁcant Sargan test statis-
tics reported in the bottom line of the table.
Comparing the estimation results of Table 6 with the
ones of Table 5, we ﬁrstly observe positive parameter
estimates for the density of PGPs, which seems to con-
ﬁrm the above mentioned cooperation and network effects
between non-contract physicians according to Hypothesis
3. Further, and in line with Hypothesis 2, we ﬁnd nega-
tive effects of CGP density again, indicating competition
between PSPs and CGPs. The exceptions are neurologists
and gynecologists with insigniﬁcant parameter estimates,
but signiﬁcantly positive estimates for private facilities of
inpatient care. This is not surprising as patients usually
do not visit a GP when demanding services from these
specialities. Most importantly however, we  now ﬁnd a sig-
niﬁcantly negative impact of CSP densities on the ones of
non-contract specialists in three out of four regressions (the
exception is non-contract surgeons in column 1 of Table 6),
indicating that there is competition between non-contract
and contract specialists within the same specialization.
This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and, to some
extent, it also conﬁrms Atella and Deb [3],  who  ﬁnd a substi-
tutive individual health care utilization between contract
and non-contract physicians using Italian data.
Overall, our estimation results suggest that referrals
from CGPs to PSPs are obviously not strong enough to
compensate competition forces between contract and non-
contract physicians, which are inherently present in the
two-tiered Austrian health care system. In contrast, we
ﬁnd a more pronounced referral behavior for PGPs, indicat-
ing cooperation and network effects within non-contract
physicians. Further, our results reveal that location deci-
sions of PSPs are negatively associated with the density of
CSPs (at least within the same specialty), suggesting that
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he market for outpatient health care of specialists reacts
o competitive forces.
. Conclusions
This paper assesses location decisions of physicians as
easured by physician densities at the regional level. We
xtend the previous research relying on a two-tiered health
are system with co-existing public (contracted) and pri-
ate health care providers. Using data from 121 Austrian
istricts between 2002 and 2008 we focus on four groups
f physicians: contract general practitioners and specialists
s well as their private counterparts. The latter are almost
ree to set prices for their services and, apart from that, are
ot restricted in their location choices. Therefore, we esti-
ate the densities of (i) non-contract specialists and (ii)
on-contract general practitioners as a function of the den-
ities of contract general practitioners and specialists and
he remaining density of non-contract physicians, along
ith other control variables such as the availability of pri-
ate and public inpatient facilities within a district. Some
f these variables are potentially endogenous, others are
ime-invariant (e.g., the availability of hospitals), suggest-
ng to apply a Hausman–Taylor framework for panel data
n our application.
Our ﬁndings might be summarized as follows. First, we
nd a positive association between the densities of non-
ontract general practitioners and non-contract specialists,
ndicating a relatively strong referral effect between these
roups of physicians. One reason might be strong collabo-
ation or even the existence of medical networks among
on-contract physicians. Second, we observe a negative
mpact of the density of contracted specialists on the one of
on-contract physicians, indicating relatively strong com-
etition forces among these physicians. Finally, we  observe
 negative impact of the density of contract general prac-
itioners on non-contract general practitioners, and an
nsigniﬁcant effect on non-contract specialists. While the
ormer result might be explained by competition among
contract and non-contract) general practitioners, the lat-
er might be a result of the referral behavior of contract
eneral practitioners, who  tend to prefer contract physi-
ians when referring to specialists.
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the
ole of non-contract physicians in the two-tiered Austrian
ealth care system in general, and as a provider of care
or clients of the public insurance system in particular. To
ate, private (non-contract) resources of outpatient care
re not included in the physician capacity plans of the pub-
ic health insurance system. While non-contract physicians
o some extent enlarge the consumer choice for publicly
unded outpatient care, private treatments usually also
nvolve substantial cost sharing. Thus, this enlargement
ffect is particularly relevant for high income patients. Fur-
hermore, we observe a marked increase in the number of
on-contract physicians (PSPs and PGPs) over the course of
he years, while the number of contract physicians strictly
ollows the capacity plans, and therefore, remained nearly
onstant over the same time period. Given the high num-
er of medical graduates from medical universities, the 106 (2012) 257– 268 267
relevance of the private health care sector will increase
further in the near future.
From a health policy perspective, the positive relation-
ship between different non-contract physician categories
is ambiguous. On the one hand, it could reﬂect the exis-
tence of efﬁcient referral systems. But on the other hand,
the expanding number of private physicians could also
indicate an increase of supplier induced demand, which
could adversely inﬂuence the macroeconomic stability of
the outpatient sector as a whole. The negative relationship
between non-contract and contract physicians – signaling
a substitution effect – could lead to the interpretation that
the private sector to some extent is an alternative to the
public sector. Given the existing institutional design, this
empirical pattern could imply that either (i) the current
capacity plans are not sufﬁcient for their speciﬁed goal of
equity in the form of an area-wide health care provision
and/or (ii) that both the increase in the number and the
positive relationship between the different types of non-
contract physicians indicate a possible increase of supplier
induced demand with negative effects on service quality
and the ﬁnancial accountability of the system in general.
While our results might stimulate further research on
location decisions of physicians, we would be cautious
to derive too far-reaching policy recommendations from
our analysis. The paper primarily focuses on spatial differ-
ences in non-contract physician density. Obviously, these
differences reﬂect varieties in the (expected) demand for
physician services, but we would need more information
on the actual utilization patterns of both contract and
non-contract physicians to propose possible changes in
the institutional design of outpatient care. Thus, further
analysis seems necessary based on more detailed infor-
mation of utilization numbers, patients’ motives to visit a
non-contract physician (e.g., quality, waiting time, and dis-
tance), and the interaction of different physician categories.
Such an analysis is beyond the scope of our paper. In addi-
tion, the necessary data to study such issues is not available
so far. As non-contract physicians are hardly regulated in
Austria, they constitute somewhat a ‘black box’ even for
the public health insurance, which (at least in part) pays for
their services. Thus, our ﬁndings also suggest to establish
a reporting system for non-contract physicians to analyze
interdependencies between different types of physicians
further.
Appendix A. Data sources
• Data on physician location is taken from CD-MED. Hand-
buch für die Sanitätsberufe Österreichs. Wien: Verlag
Dieter Göschl; 2002–2008.
• Information on the number of hospital beds in public
and private hospitals is covered in BMG. Krankenanstal-
tenverzeichnis Österreich. Wien: Bundesministerium für
Gesundheit; 2008.
• Data on a district’s population, educational level and liv-
ing area is compiled in Statistik Austria. Volkszählung,
Wien (Austrian Population Census); 2002.
• Region’s income is calculated from Statistik Austria. Inte-
grierte Statistik der Lohn- und Einkommensteuer. Wien;
2004–2006.
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